US Foreign Policy

“Fighting Starts When Talking Stops”: The South China Sea Conflict in the Light of a New US Foreign Policy

Donald Trump's second term in office is causing unrest in the Pacific. Many countries bordering the South China Sea fear that US support will wane and that China's behaviour could become even more aggressive. Will Trump's isolationism also affect the Indo-Pacific region, giving China ‘free rein’?   

This question was discussed by the Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats (CALD) with the support of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom on 3 April in Manila at a regional conference on  'South China Sea Disputes Under Trump 2.0: Finding Common Ground among Claimant States'. The conference brought together experts from academia, politics and journalism, as well as diplomats from neighbouring Indonesia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Malaysia. Experts from the European Union and South Korea were also present. The conference focused on analysing the complex geopolitical tensions in the South China Sea against the backdrop of a changing new US foreign policy.

Other partners of the conference were the Centre for Liberalism and Democracy (CLD), the Faculty of International Studies of Miriam College and the Philippine International Studies Organisation (PHISO).

One sea, many claims: the conflict in the South China Sea

China claims around 90 per cent of the South China Sea - an area known as the West Philippine Sea in the Philippines and the East Sea in Vietnam. The Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei also claim parts of this strategically and economically important sea. Particularly controversial are areas claimed by China that fall within the territorial waters and exclusive economic zones of other countries, such as the Philippines.

In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled in favour of the Philippines and rejected China's claims, which Beijing tried to prove with historical maps. The court concluded that China has no historical right to the disputed territories and that the so-called 'nine-dash line', to which China refers in its territorial claims, has no basis in international law. China still refuses to accept the ruling and continues its aggressive expansionist policies in the South China Sea.

Nothing is certain

The foreign policy uncertainties of Donald Trump's second term in office, as well as Beijing's increasingly nationalistic stance could have a significant impact on the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. This volatile environment makes the region one of the world's most explosive flashpoints. This was starkly evident at the 61st Munich Security Conference in February 2025, when representatives from the Philippines and China engaged in a heated exchange over the South China Sea dispute.

Of utmost importance is how the US will act in this conflict, or rather, towards its partners in the region. There seems to be no clear answer to this question. This became particularly clear when US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, during a visit to the Philippines on March 28, described the defense alliance between the two countries as “ironclad” and assured that the US would prioritize the region. On April 3, Trump then imposed significant tariffs on all neighboring countries, not just China, ranging from 17% for the Philippines to 46% for Vietnam. Only to suspend the tariffs again a few days later, with the exception of China. On Trump's tariff presentation, Taiwan was referred to as a country, which in turn angered China.

The situation in the South China Sea and the Trump administration's foreign policy: experts share their assessments

Dr I-Chung Lai, President of the Prospect Foundation in Taiwan, takes a broader view of the conflict in the South China Sea. He believes that the People's Republic of China's aggressive stance is not primarily about territorial or historical claims, but about strategic dominance in the entire Asia-Pacific region and and pushing the US out of the region. Lai believes that at the heart of the disputes it's China against the other neighbouring countries. He made it clear that Taiwan's position in the dispute is independent of China's, and that Taiwan does not regard the territorial boundary China has drawn in the South China Sea as a fixed national boundary. Unlike China, Taiwan also respects the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Dr Renato C. De Castro of De La Salle University in Manila sees a strong US interest in containing China's dominance in the Indo-Pacific. He pointed to a recent document from the US Department of Defense that clearly prioritises the Indo-Pacific region over Europe in US foreign policy. He interprets this as confirmation that the US will not drop its Asian partners "like a hot potato", as it did with Ukraine.

Edcel Ibarra, assistant professor at the University of the Philippines, shares this assessment, but pointed out that it could result in a purely military partnership between the US and the Philippines. He argues that intensified US-China rivalry could further divide the neighboring states. He expects a change in US foreign policy in the region only if Trump were to strike a deal with China.

The Indonesian ambassador to the Philippines, Agus Widjojo, made it clear that his country does not have any territorial claims in the South China Sea. At the same time, Indonesia firmly rejects China's nine-dash line, as it has no legal basis and contradicts the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Widjojo reaffirmed Indonesia's commitment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict and emphasized the central role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in this regional issue.

Leila de Lima, spokesperson for the Liberal Party of the Philippines and former justice minister of the Philippines, stressed the global significance of the conflict beyond Asia: “This is about values such as the international order and the principles of international law. Because China is undermining precisely these principles, the global order is also affected.”

No solution in sight

Participants at the conference, particularly those from countries that are regional partners of the US, were fairly optimistic that the US would continue its military support. This optimism seems to stem from a lack of alternatives and the dramatic consequences that a US withdrawal from the region would entail. Professor De Castro illustrated this by comparing the situation with Europe, pointing out that NATO has a security mechanism even without US participation. The system of bilateral alliances in Asia does not provide this form of security. In an unpredictable geopolitical situation, the region lacks a comparable safety net.

During the conference, there were repeated calls, that Taiwan should be more involved in resolving the conflict. By contrast, the experts expect little impetus from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The disappointing track record of the alliance in this conflict was repeatedly pointed out: in almost 40 years, the alliance, which is based on consensus decision-making, has only adopted two non-binding declarations. An opportunity could arise here in 2026, when the Philippines takes over the ASEAN chairmanship. This could help to bring the issue back to the attention of Southeast Asian countries. Gerry Bulatao, chairman of the Center for Liberalism and Democracy, put it succinctly: “It's always better to talk rather than fight. And fighting starts when talking stops”.

* Thekla Ebbert is the Regional Project Coordinator of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom in Southeast and East Asia.